

PHIL 125: BEYOND DUALISM

<https://canvas.harvard.edu/courses/8467>

Harvard University

Spring 2016

INSTRUCTOR

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Office Hours: M 1-2, W 4-5 and by appointment

COURSE DESCRIPTION

Few metaphysicians would identify as Cartesian dualists today. Nevertheless, it's hard to deny that we live in a world shaped by Cartesian dualism: we distinguish somatic health from mental health; we dissociate our minds from our bodies on the elliptical trainer; we try to get the mind back into the body at yoga; we say that people with gender dysphoria feel their psychological gender identity is out of line with their physical sex. After looking at the two sides of Cartesian dualism, Cartesian body and Cartesian mind, we will consider some of the notorious metaphysical problems it gives rise to and five (or four and a half) 17th century attempts to push back against it in the figures of Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, Descartes himself (the "half"), Henry More, Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

Phil 125 is a course in the history of philosophy. As a philosophy course, we will focus on the philosophical positions and arguments for them that our philosophers offer. As a history of philosophy course, we will engage in the sympathetic reconstruction of our philosophers' positions and arguments; this will require that we take into consideration, as much as we can, their 17th century philosophical motives and intellectual context.

If you work hard in this course, you can expect to:

- better understand some central topics of discussion among of 17th c. philosophers, along with the various motivations for and constraints on the positions they hold;
- clearly articulate those positions and the arguments our philosophers offer for them in discussion and in writing;
- critically evaluate those positions and arguments; that means determining their *assumptions* and their *consequences*, reconstructing the *arguments* and *sub-arguments*, and *assessing* the arguments for cogency given the assumptions and consequences;
- develop your skills in a cooperative philosophical discussion that aims at the shared goal of better understanding the texts, positions, and arguments;
- better understand how conceptual change comes about;
- practice using the philosophical tools you have acquired in other philosophy courses: conceptual analysis, thought experiment, counterexamples, disambiguation of concepts and positions, argument reconstruction and/or mapping, etc.;
- and develop your research skills through the writing of a research paper.

PREPARATION FOR THE COURSE

This course is an upper level philosophy course designed for advanced concentrators and starting graduate students. The preparation I will expect from you includes:

- familiarity with basic philosophical concepts and tools;
- some familiarity with early modern philosophy (e.g., I will assume you have been through Descartes's argument for mind-body dualism and his substance-principle attribute-mode ontology);
- familiarity with the norms of philosophical writing (I do not expect you to have done a *research* paper in philosophy before, but I do expect you to have worked on the basic skills of philosophical writing);
- familiarity with basic research tools in philosophy and accessing online texts: EEBO (*Early English Texts Online*); *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*; *PhilPapers*, *Philosophers Index* and *JStor*; online journals; and Widener! NB: *You should never use Wikipedia for scholarly research.*

COURSE TEXTS

Required Primary Texts:

- Cavendish, Margaret. 1664. *Philosophical Letters: Or, modest reflections upon some opinions in natural philosophy, maintained by several famous and learned authors of this age, expressed by way of letters: By the thrice noble, illustrious, and excellent princess, The Lady Marchioness of Newcastle.* Available online through EEBO (Early English Books Online; access through Hollis). The ones we will focus on are also available through Stewart Duncan's website (see below).
- Cavendish, Margaret. 2001 (originally 1666). *Observations upon Experimental Philosophy.* Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Edited by Eileen O'Neill. Cambridge. ISBN-13: 978-0521776752. *Observations* is also available online through EEBO, but not with O'Neill's very helpful introduction; it is an image of the original.
- Cavendish, Margaret. 1668. *Grounds of Natural Philosophy.* London. Available online through EEBO.
- Conway, Anne. 1996 (originally 1690). *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy.* Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Edited by Allison P. Coudert and Taylor Corse. Cambridge. ISBN-13: 978-0521479042. *Principles* is also available online through EEBO, though without the helpful introduction by Coudert.
- Descartes, René. *The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes.* Translated and edited by Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch. Volumes 1-2. (Cambridge, 1985) ISBN-13: 978-0521288071 and 978-0521288088.
- Poullain de la Barre, François. *Three Cartesian Feminist Treatises.* Translated by Vivien Bosley. *The Other Voice in Early Modern Europe* series. (Chicago, 2002). ISBN-13: 978-0226676548. (I will make the relevant bits of this text available on the website.)
- Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia and Descartes, René. *The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes.* Edited and translated by Lisa Shapiro. (Chicago, 2007). ISBN-13: 978-0226204420
- More, Henry. 1659. *Immortality of the Soul.* London. Available online through EEBO.

Recommended Primary and Secondary Texts:

- Broad, Jacqueline. *Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century.* Cambridge. ISBN-13: 978-0521039178.
- Descartes, René. 1991. *The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes.* Translated and edited by Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch and Kenny. Volume 3: The Correspondence. Cambridge. ISBN-13: 978-0521423502.

_____. *The World and Other Writings*. Translated and edited by Stephen Gaukroger. *Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy*. (Cambridge, 1998). ISBN-13: 978-0521636469.

Useful Resources:

EEBO (*Early English Books Online*) is a terrific resource for finding English language works that are now in the public domain. It is accessible through Hollis and through the course website.

Project VOX: a website devoted to compiling materials on women philosophers of the early modern period: <http://projectvox.library.duke.edu/pg/>

Kroetsch, Cameron. Annotated Guide to Margaret Cavendish's Texts: <http://www.digitalcavendish.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Kroetsch2013.pdf>

Duncan, Stewart. Guide to Margaret Cavendish's *Philosophical Letters*: <http://stewartduncan.org/letters-philosophical-letters/>.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

- **Attendance.** We meet only once a week. If you miss class, you will miss some critical discussion and the rest of us will miss your contributions. That said, I realize that even the most diligent students have to miss a class on occasion due to illness or some other emergency. Please notify me if you have such an issue.
- **Active participation** in discussion. That doesn't mean dominating the conversation. Active participation includes things like attentively listening, asking questions, offering supporting evidence for someone's claim, and even clarifying what someone else has said. NB: for discussion to be productive, we will need to establish a classroom in which we respect each others' contributions but also demonstrate a willingness to challenge ideas and have our own ideas challenged.
- **Preparation.** Come to class prepared: carefully read the required texts; take notes on them; formulate questions about them; and complete the weekly assignment.
- **Weekly assignments.** In the first half of the course, I will give you specific weekly writing assignments **due by 9 p.m. on Monday night**. In the second half of the course, you will participate in a weekly correspondence with other members of the class. Here's how that will work. I will divide you into groups. Group 1 will post a thought-provoking question about the reading **due by 5 p.m. on Monday**. The question should be well-developed: cite or quote the relevant text; state the question; explain why the question seems an important one to answer; perhaps take a stab at possible ways in which to answer the question. Group 2 will post a considered response to one or more of Group 1's posts by **9 a.m. on Tuesday**. OPTION: Group 1 may, if it likes, get together to construct a single group question for Group 2. And Group 2 can, if it likes, get together to construct a single group answer for Group 1.

These assignments are designed with two aims in mind: (a) to give you some practice in philosophical and historical skills and (b) to prepare us for an informed and productive discussion together in class. They will be graded on a 0/1 basis.

- **Research paper.** You will write a research paper of 15-20 double-spaced pages due during exam week. Writing a research paper is a process that includes exploring the field and literature, identifying an appropriately focused topic, gathering suitable secondary literature, creating an annotated bibliography, formulating a thesis, garnering evidence *and* counter-evidence for your thesis, drafting the paper, consulting with others, and rewriting

your paper. To assist you in the process, you will have a second set of weekly tasks to complete during the second half of the course that will also be graded on a 0/1 basis.

GRADES

Your grade will be determined as follows:

Weekly Assignments: 30%

Research Steps: 10%

Research Paper: 40%

Participation: 20%

ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

Discussion and the exchange of ideas are essential to doing philosophy, and so I encourage you to talk about the course material with other students. On the other hand, *the work you hand in for your assignments and your research paper must be your own*. If books, articles, websites, or discussions have helped you formulate your ideas, cite them. Plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty are serious offenses that undermine the trust on which the scholarly endeavor rests.

ACCOMMODATIONS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES

Students needing academic adjustments or accommodations because of a documented disability must present their Faculty Letter from the [Accessible Education Office](#) (AEO) and speak with me by the end of the second week of the term. Failure to do so may result in my inability to respond in a timely manner.

COURSE CALENDAR

Secondary literature marked with an asterisk (*) is the literature to start with on the topic.

January 26: Introduction

In the initial meeting I will (a) introduce the topic of the course, (b) survey the metaphysical transition from Aristotelian hylomorphism to Cartesian dualism, and (c) survey the dramatic changes brought about by Descartes' realigning the conceptions soul, mind, body and life. I recommend that you review Cartesian dualism by reading the following things:

Meditations, "Synopsis" (CSM II 9-11)

Principles I.51-75 (CSM I 210-222)

Rozemond, Marleen. 2008. "Descartes's Dualism." In *A Companion to Descartes*. Edited by Janet Broughton and John Carriero. Blackwell. 372-389.

February 2: Descartes' Conception of Body 1 (Metaphysics and Physics)

This week we'll look closely at Descartes' conception of the nature of body (or matter or material substance) and some of its consequences: the relation between body and space; the rejection of void or empty space; the nature of rarefaction and condensation; impenetrability; motion; force and cause of motion; individuation of bodies.

Required Reading:

The World (CSM I 79-98); *Principles*, "Preface to the French Edition" and "Dedicatory Letter to Elizabeth" (CSM I 179-192), I.51-76 (CSM I 210-222), Book II (CSM I 223-247), Letters

to More (CSM III 360-367, 371-375, 380-382). (Also for Arnauld (AT V 194 & 224 for another go at no void)

Assignment 1: Exposition due Monday February 1 @ 9 p.m.

Recommended Secondary Literature (places to start to poke around in the issues):

Della Rocca, Michael. 1999. "When a Body Meet a Body. In *New Essays on The Rationalists*.

Edited by R. J. Gennaro and C. Huenemann. Oxford.: 48-81.

Des Chene, Dennis. 1996. *Physiologia*. Cornell. Chapter 8 "Motion and Its Causes" and Chapter 9 "Parts of Matter."

*Hatfield, Gary. 19979. "Force (God) in Descartes' Physics." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 10: 113-140.

Reid, Jasper. 2014. "Descartes and the Individuation of Bodies." *Archiv* 96(1): 38-70.

*Woolhouse, Roger. 1994. "Descartes and the Nature of Body." *BJHP* 2(1): 19-33.

February 9: Descartes' Conception of Body 2 (Biology and Psychology)

This week we will look at Descartes' mechanism, and in particular his mechanization of life and much of psychology. The first thing to come to grips with is *how very much* Descartes attempts to mechanize. The second thing to puzzle over are the difficulties he runs into: what is the principle of life (what distinguishes living from non-living bodies?); how do we individuate one organism from another (the "boundary problem") and a single organism over time (the "growth problem"?); do biological functions smuggle in illegitimate teleology?; what's the relationship between the functional and micromechanical levels of analysis?; what is the metaphysical status of an organism?

Required Reading:

Treatise on Man (CSM I 99-108) [nb: the full version of the text is available in the Gaukroger edition noted above]; *Discourse on Method* 5-6 (CSM I 131-151); *Description of the Human Body* (CAM 314-324); *Passions* I.2-6 (CSM I 327-334). NB: Don't get bogged down in the details of the mechanisms. What you are looking for is the vision.

Assignment 2: Argument Reconstruction due Monday February 8 @ 9 p.m.

Recommended Secondary Literature:

Brown, Deborah. 2011. "Cartesian Functional Analysis." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. DOI:10.1080/00048402.2011.566274.

Des Chene, Dennis. 2001. *Spirits & Clocks: Machine & Organism in Descartes*. Cornell. Introduction, Chapter 4 "Tools of Knowledge" and Chapter 6 "Unity of the Body."

*Detlefsen, Karen. 2015. "Descartes on the Theory of Life and Methodology in the Life Sciences." In *Early Modern Medicine and Natural Philosophy*. History, Philosophy and Theory in the Life Science 14. Edited by P. Distelzweig et al. Springer. Uncorrected Proofs.

Hatfield, Gary. 2008. "Animals." In *A Companion to Descartes*. Edited by J. Broughton and J. Carriero. Blackwell. 404-425.

*Hatfield, Gary. 2012. "Mechanizing the Sensitive Soul." In *Matter and Form in Early Modern Science*. Edited by G. Manning. Brill. 151-186.

February 16: Descartes' Conception of Mind

This week we will look at Descartes' two-step transformation of the *other* aspect of the world: (a) the transformation from soul to the mind and (b) the transformation from mind to Cartesian mind. (Both occur sneakily in Meditation 2.) We'll puzzle over the nature of the Cartesian mind. It is a thinking thing. But what is thought? We'll also attend to the differences between the embodied mind and the disembodied mind.

Required Primary Reading:

Optics 4-6 (CSM I 164-175); *Meditations*, Meditation 2 (CSM II 16-23), Meditation 3, paras 5-15 (CSM II 25-29), Meditation 6 (CSM II 50-62); *Principles* I.8-12 (CSM I 195-197), IV.187-197 (CSM I 278-284); *Comments on a Certain Broadsheet* (CSM I 294-311); *Passions* I.17-29 (CSM I 335-339); *O&R* 3.2-8 (CSM 122-130); *O&R* 4.1 (CSM I 138-144 and 154-162); *O&R* 6.9 (CSM I 281-282 and 294-296).

Also worth looking at: *O&R* 2.1 (CSM II 77-78, 93-96); *O&R* 2 Appendix - definitions and proposition 4 (CSM II 113-114 and 199); *O&R* 3.2 (CSM II 122-124); *O&R* 4.1 (CSM II 139-144, 154-162), *O&R* 5, On the Second Meditation, topic 4 (CSM II 183-185, 246-247); *O&R* 6, Appendix and Reply 10 (CSM II 282-284, 296-301).

Assignment 3: Gathering Evidence and Counter-Evidence due Monday February 15 @ 9 p.m.

Recommended Secondary Reading:

- Alanen, Lilli. 2003. *Descartes's Concept of Mind*. Harvard. Chapter 3 "Thought, Consciousness, and Language."
- Pasnau, Robert. 2007. "The Mind-Soul Problem." In *Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima*. Edited by P. J.J.M. Bakker and J. M.M.H. Thijssen. Ashgate. 3-20.
- *Rozemond, Marleen. 2006. "The Nature of the Mind." In *The Blackwell Guide to Descartes' Meditations*. Edited by Stephen Gaukroger. Blackwell. 48-66.
- Simmons, Alison. 2012. "Cartesian Consciousness Reconsidered." *Philosophers' Imprint* 12(2): 1-21.

February 23: Elizabeth Poses a Problem: Interaction (and Union)

This week we'll look at one of the most famous problems to which Cartesian dualism gives rise: mind-body causal interaction. Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia poses the problem to Descartes. Descartes fails to give her a direct answer. (He starts talking about mind-body union, which we'll turn to next week.) Scholars, however, have tried mightily to answer Elizabeth's question. Much of the contemporary scholarship focuses on (a) whether Descartes thinks (or should think) there is *genuine efficient causation* between mind and body or only *occasional causation* and (b) assuming Descartes thinks there's genuine efficient causation, whether and how the causal principles he articulates in Meditation 3 can accommodate it in the case of mind-body. Rozemond refocuses the question. She asks what the *nature* of the problem is supposed to be, distinguishing a "Heterogeneity Problem" and a "Dissimilarity Problem." NB: There are two directions in which the causal relation must work (body to mind [e.g., sensory perception] and mind to body [e.g., voluntary action]). The scholarship on interaction tends to focus on the former.

Required Primary Reading

Review Meditation 3 (focusing on the causal principles) and Meditation 6 (focusing on the institution of nature between brain and mind); O&R 6, Appendix and Reply 10 (CSM II 282-284, 296-301); *Passions* I.30-50 (CSM I 338-348); *Letter to Hyperaspistes* August 1641, point 2 (CSMK 189-190); *Letters for Arnauld* (CSMK 354-356 and 356-359); *Correspondence with Elisabeth*, 6 May 1643 to 1 July 1643 (Shapiro 61-73); *Comments on a Certain Broadsheet* (CSM I 294-311).

Required Secondary Reading

*Rozemond, Marleen. 1999. "Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction: What's the Problem?" *JHP* 37(3): 435-367.

Assignment 4: Concise Exposition due Monday February 22 @ 9 p.m.

Recommended Secondary Reading

Garber, Daniel. 1982. "Understanding Interaction: What Descartes Should have told Elizabeth." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* Supp.21: 15-32.

O'Neill, Eileen. 1987. "Mind-Body Interaction and Metaphysical Consistency: A Defense of Descartes." *JHP* 25(2): 227-45.

Schmaltz, Tad. 1992. "Sensation, Occasionalism, and Descartes' Causal Principles." *North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy* 2: 37-55.

March 1: Descartes attempts a Response: Union (and Interaction)

This week we return to Descartes' response to Elizabeth. What is this "primitive notion of the mind-body union" that is supposed to help her understand mind-body interaction? There are at least two issues at stake here. First, how do mind and body together (two substances) form a *single* human being? Second, how does the union help us understand the mind-to-body causal interaction with which Elizabeth was concerned? Descartes persistently relies on a puzzling analogy with gravity or heaviness to explain himself. (He offers it to Elizabeth, but repeats it to Arnauld.) What's up with that?

Scholarship on the mind-body union has focused on several issues:

1. What's the relationship between *mind-body interaction* and *mind-body union*? Is one prior to the other? Does union simply *consist* in there being causal interaction between mind and body? Or is there something more to it? Does, in fact, the possibility of mind-body interaction depend on an antecedent metaphysical union between mind and body? (Radner 1971; Broughton and Mattern 1978; Chappell 1994; Schmaltz 1992; Voss 1994)
2. *Nature of the union*. Responses run from (a) an Aristotelian substance (Hoffman 1986) and (b) a third Cartesian substance (Schmaltz 1992) to (c) nothing more than two Cartesian substances causally linked (Chappell 1994; Bennett 1994), with a whole lot of positions in between (Alanen 2008; Brown 2007; Curley and Koivuniemi forthcoming; Hoffman 1986; Rozemond 1998 chapter 5; Schmaltz 1992; Shapiro 2003; Simmons manuscript)
3. Is the mind united to the *whole body* or just to *one part* of the body, viz., the pineal gland? This topic raises the spectre of "holenmerism" (the view that the soul is whole in the whole of the body *and* whole in any single part of it); if the soul is present *in the whole body* does that

make it extended? (Rozemond 2003) NB: some think that Descartes is torn between his mechanism and Christian doctrine on this topic.

Required Primary Reading:

Letters to Regius (CSMK 181-183, 199-201, 205-209, 210, 213-214, 254-255); *Letter to Mesland* (CSMK 241-244); *Letters to Arnauld* (CSMK 354-356 and 356-359) and *Correspondence with Elizabeth*, 6 May 1643 to 1 July 1643 (Shapiro 61-73) and 8 July 1644 to 24 July 1645 (Shapiro 81-96); review the *Passions* I.30-50 (CSM I 338-348).

Assignment 5: Sympathetic Interpretation due Monday February 29 @ 9 p.m.

Recommended Secondary Reading (taking its lead from the correspondence with Elisabeth):

*Curley, Ed and Koivuniemi, Minna. Forthcoming. "A Kind of Dualism." *Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy*. Oxford.

Normore, C.G. 2011. "Cartesian Unions." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 35: 223-239.

Perler, Dominik. Forthcoming. "Human Being." Entry prepared for *The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon*. Edited by Larry Nolan. Cambridge.

*Rozemond, Marleen. 2003. "Descartes, Mind-Body Union, and Holenmerism." *Philosophical Topics* 31(1-2): 343-367.

*Simmons, Alison. Manuscript. "Mind-Body Union and the Limits of Cartesian Metaphysics."

Yandell, David. 1997. "What Descartes Really Told Elisabeth: Mind-Body Union as a Primitive Notion." *BJHP* 5(2): 249-273.

Further Reading:

Fowler, C.F., O.P. 1999. *Descartes on the Human Soul: Philosophy and the Demands of Christian Doctrine*. Kluwer.

March 8: Methodological Questions

This week we take a step back to ask some methodological questions. We've been focused on Descartes' dualism. The traditional next step would be turn to Spinoza and Leibniz. We are not going to do that. Instead we are going to read the work of less familiar philosophers: Henry More (we've met him already), Margaret Cavendish, and Anne Conway. In this transitional week, we'll talk about reasons that these figures have been left out of the "canon" and reasons for reshaping the canon by introducing them into it. We'll also look at one way in which Cartesianism was thought to bear on "women's issues" (including equality and education) in the 17th century.

Required Reading

O'Neill, Eileen. 1997. "Disappearing Ink: Early Modern Women Philosophers and Their Fate in History." In *Philosophy in a Feminist Voice*. Edited by Janet A. Kourany. Princeton, 1997. 17-62.

Poullain del Barre, François. 2002 (orig. 1673). "On the Equality of the Sexes." In *Three Cartesian Feminist Treatises*. The Other Voice in Early Modern Europe series. Translated by Vivien Bosley. Introductions by Marcelle Maistre Welch. Chicago. (website)

Discussion 1: Online Correspondence Posts

Group 1: due Monday March 7 @ 5 p.m. (note change of time!)

Group 2: due Tuesday March 8 @ 9 a.m. (note change of time!)

Research Step 1: Philosophical Topics, due Friday March 11 @ 5 p.m. (note the date!)

Recommended Reading

Harth, Erica. 1992. *Cartesian Women: Version and Subversions of Rational Discourse in the Old Regime*. Reading Women Writing Series. Cornell.

*Shapiro, Lisa. "What is a Philosophical Canon?" (manuscript posted on <https://philosophymodsquad.wordpress.com>)

Smith, Justin. "The Two Libraries Problem" (manuscript posted on <https://philosophymodsquad.wordpress.com>.)

March 15: SPRING BREAK

March 22: Henry More's dualism

Henry More was as much a dualist as Descartes, but he drew the line between body and soul in a different place and he had reasons to hang onto the word "soul" or "spirit" rather than switch over to the more Cartesian "mind." Because his work is especially difficult, I strongly recommend reading the Sarah Hutton piece to orient yourself to More and our next philosopher, Cavendish, and then the Jasper Reid piece to guide you through the details of and problems for More's conception of extended soul or spirit. You will need to rely on all the philosophical skills we've been working on in the coming weeks!

Required Primary Text:

More, Henry. *Immortality of the Soul*. Book I, chapters 1-5, 7-8, 11. [For some interesting arguments against materialism, venture into Book III!]

Discussion 2: Online Correspondence Posts

Group 2: due Monday March 21 @ 5 p.m.

Group 1: due Tuesday March 22 @ 9 a.m.

Research Step 2: Annotated Bibliography A, due Friday March 25 @ 5 p.m.

Recommended Secondary Literature

*Hutton, Sarah. 2003. "Henry More and Margaret Cavendish." In *A Princely Brave Woman: Essays on Margaret Cavendish, Dutchess of Newcastle*. Edited by Stephen Clucas. Ashgate. 185-198.

*Reid, Jasper. 2003. "Henry More on Material and Spiritual Extension" *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review* 42(2): 532-553.

March 29: Margaret Cavendish 1: Method and Overview

Margaret Cavendish was a phenomenon. We will start by getting oriented to her, her use of different genres, her writings, her influences and targets. We will then talk about her observations on method. As you'll see, she's highly skeptical of the value of the new experimental sciences and the use of devices like lenses (microscopes, telescopes), preferring a more Cartesian intellectualist methodology.

Required Primary Texts

Observations Preface (7-10) *Observations* 2-3 (48-53) and 34 (135-136) *Philosophical Letters* I.1 (EEBO and website).

Discussion 3: Online Correspondence Posts

Group 1: due Monday March 28 @ 5 p.m.

Group 2: due Tuesday March 29 @ 9 a.m.

Research Step 3: Project Description, due Friday April 1 @ 5 p.m.

Recommended Secondary Literature

Broad, Jacqueline. 2002. *Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century*. Cambridge. Chapter 2.

*O'Neill, Eileen. Introduction to the *Observations*. x-xxxvi.

April 5: Margaret Cavendish, The Material World

This week we'll focus on Cavendish's brand of materialism. Features of it to consider: the three "degrees" of matter (inanimate, animate-sensitive, animate-rational); matter as self-moving; anti-atomism; matter is a unity and not composed of parts; parts of composed bodies vs. principle of body as such.

Required Primary Texts

Observations Introduction (review xxiii-xxxv), An Argumental Discourse (23-42);

Observations 1 (46-48), 15 (68-72), 25 (95-100), 31 (135-131), 37.3-7 (157-165) and 37.15

(184-185), *Philosophical Letters* I.23 & 30 (website), *Grounds of Natural Philosophy* Part I

(website).

Discussion 4: Online Correspondence Posts

Group 2: due Monday April 4 @ 5 p.m.

Group 1 due Tuesday April 5 @ 9 a.m.

Research Step 4: Annotated Bibliography B, due Friday April 8 @ 5 p.m.

Recommended Secondary Literature

*Detlefsen, Karen. 2006. "Atomism, Monism, and Causation in the Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish." In *Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy* 3: 199-240.

April 12: Margaret Cavendish, Perception and Knowledge

This week we turn to Cavendish's account of perception and knowledge, both her claim that these are features of matter and her account of how they work via "patterning." Also relevant here is her conception of the material world as orderly.

Required Primary Texts

Observations 35-37 (137-194), *Philosophical Letters* I.35-37 (website)

Discussion 5: Online Correspondence Posts

Group 1: due Monday April 11 @ 5 p.m.

Group 2: due Tuesday April 12 @ 9 a.m.

Research Step 5: Research Diary, due Friday April 15 @ 5 p.m.

Recommended Secondary Literature

- Boyle, Deborah. 2015. "Margaret Cavendish on Perception, Self-Knowledge, and Probable Opinion." *Philosophy Compass* 10(7): 438-450.
- Cunning, David. 2006. "Cavendish on the Intelligibility of the Prospect of Thinking Matter." *HPQ* 23(2): 117-136.
- Detlefsen, Karen. 2007. "Reason and Freedom: Margaret Cavendish on the Order and Disorder of Nature." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 89: 157-191.
- Michaelian, Kourken. 2009. "Margaret Cavendish's Epistemology." *BJHP* 17(1): 31-53.

April 19: Conway, Materialist or Spiritualist?

This week we'll look at Anne Conway's metaphysics. She's clear that there are three basic metaphysical categories: God, creation, and something in between that mediates the two (which she identifies with Christ). Each has its own principal attribute (immutability, mutability, and something in between). We'll focus on the nature of creation, but just how to characterize that nature is a vexed matter. Question: how would you compare Cavendish's metaphysics with Conway's?

Required Primary Text

Coudert's *Introduction; The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, focus on chs. 7-9 (Chapters 1-4 focus on God and creation; Chapters 5-6 focus on the Kabbalah).

Discussion 6: Online Correspondence Posts

- Group 2: due Monday April 18 @ 5 p.m.
- Group 1: due Tuesday April 19 @ 9 a.m.

Research Step 6: Portfolio, due Friday April 22 @ 5 p.m.

Recommended Secondary Literature

- Broad, Jacqueline. 2002. *Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century*. Cambridge. Chapter 2.
- Hutton, Sarah. 2004. *Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher*. Cambridge.
- Lascano, Marcy. 2013. "Anne Conway: Bodies in the Spiritual World." *Philosophy Compass* 8(4): 327-336.

April 26: Research Project Presentations